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RECENT CASES
ACTION-CAUSES OF ACTION-PAYMENT BY INSTALLMENTS.-PUCKETT
v. NATIONAL ANNUITY ASS'N, 114 S. W. 1039 (Mo.).-Held, that a
single default in the payment of an installment due under a contract
calling for periodic payments does not constitute a repudiation of the
contract so as to empower the creditor to sue for payments falling due in
the future.
It is well settled that an action is maintainable to recover an install-
ment due on a note payable by installments, some of which are not due.
Basler v. Nichols, 8 Ind. 260; Tucker v. Randall, 2 Mass. 283. And such
failure to pay an installment, although a breech of the contract, is ground
for recovery only on those unpaid installments due or past due at the
time suit is brought. Thomas v. Richards, 124 Ga. 942. It has been held,
however, that if a person is bound by a bond with a penalty conditioned
to be discharged by the payment of several sums at different times, a suit
will lie immediately after the time fixed for the payment of any one
installment has elapsed, although the other sums may not be due. Cocke
v. Stewart, 2 Overt. (Tenn.) 231.
CONTRACTS-FAILURE TO PERFORM-EFFECT.-MCCORMICK v. TAPPEN-
DORF, 99 PAC. 2 (Wash.)-Held, that where a party to a contract indicates
that he cannot or will not perfom, the other party will not be bound by the
contract. Mount, J., dissenting.
The general rule is that where one of the parties to a contract declares
that he will not perform his part, or so acts as to make it impossible for
him to do so, he thereby releases the other from the contract and its
obligations. Wolf v. Marsh, 54 Cal. 228; Miller v. Ward, 2 Conn. 494.
It has also been held that one who has violated his obligations under a
contract is in no position either to compel the other party to fulfill his
duties, or to complain because the latter is unwilling to do so. Shaeffer
v. Blair, 149 U. S. 248; Pittsburgh Bessemere Steel Rail Co. v. Hinckley,
17 Fed. 584. But a mere declaration made by one bound to perform a
future act, before the time for doing it, that he will not do it, is of itself
no breach of contract. McPherson v. Walker, 40 Ill. 371. However, if
this declaration is not withdrawn when the time arrives for the act to be
done, it is a sufficient excuse for the default of the other party. Carstens
v. McDonald, 38 Neb. 858.
CONTRACT-PARTIAL PERFORMANCE-RIGHT OF RECOVERY.-MOORE ET AL.
v. BOARD OF REGENTS, 115 S. W. 6 (Mo.).-Held, that a contractor who
only partially performs his contract is entitled to recover a reasonable
value of work done, and materials furnished not exceeding the contract
price, and deducting any damages suffered by the owner.
It is generally held that the contractor may recover for partial
performance where complete performance is prevented by the act of God
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or the public enemy. Butterfield v. Byron, 153 .Mass. 517; Hollis v. Chap-
man, 36 Tex. I; Parker v. Macomber, 17 R. I. 674.' In cases where the
contractor willfully abandons his contract the general rule is that he
cannot recover for partial performance. Serber v. McLaughlin, 97 Ill.
App. io5; Hartman v. Meighan, 171 Pa. St. 46. But there is conflict on
this point, other courts deciding that the contractor may recover for
work done and materials furnished, less any damage resulting to the
owner. Wolf v. Gerr, 43 Ia. 339; Barnwell v. Kempton, 22 Kan. 314. If
the owner prevents the contractor from completing the contract, recovery
may be had upon a quantum meruit. Adams v. Burbank, io3 Cal. 646;
Guerdon v. Corbett, 87 Ill. 272; Jones v. Call, 93 N. C. i7o. But in all
the above cases the following two rules govern, namely, that the con-
tractor must have a legal excuse for non-performance of the contract;
Phelps v. Hubbard, 59 Ill. 79; Fairfax Co. v. Chambers, 75 Md. 6o4; and
that the partial performance must be of some benefit to the adverse party.
Boughton v. Smith, 142 N. Y. 674; Genni v. Hahn, 82 Wis. go.
DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTIoN-ADvANCEMENTS-HELPLESS ADULT CHIL-
DREN.-CRAIN V. MALONE, 113 S. W. 67 (KY.).-The Ky. St. 19o3, Sect.
1407, requires property given a descendant to be charged against him on the
distribution of the undivised estate. In an action brought under this
statute, held, that the statute does not authorize a charge against an
insane adult child for the value of his support since majority by his
parents.
The prevailing doctrine is that relations-are liable for the support of
helpless adult children. Watt v. Smith, 89 Cal. 6o2; Pa. State Lunatic
Hospital v. Franklin, 30 Pa. St. 522. However, in Iowa the word
"relations" in the code, making relations of -an insane person liable for
his support in a hospital, means those only bound by law to support a
patient, and the father is not liable for the support of an adult child.
Monroe Co. v. Teller, 51 Ia. 670. In many of the older cases, it was held
that a father is not liable for the support of a helpless adult child, in the
absence of a statute to the contrary. Bennet v. Canterbury, 23 Conn. 356.
The father of an indigent adult insane child is not liable for his support
while in an asylum. Sussex Co. v. Jacobs, 6 Houst. 330.
DIVORCE-DEFENCES-REcRIMINATION-.MATTISON V. MATTISON, 113 N.
Y. SuPP. 1024.-Held, that abandonment by a husband of his wife will
not prevent him from obtaining a divorce for her subsequent adultery.
The general rule of law is that divorce is a remedy for the innocent
as against the guilty, and will not be granted where both parties are at
a fault. Rose v. Rose, 5I Hun. (N. Y.) 154. The equitable maxim, "He
who comes into equity must come with clean hands," has been applied in
dealing with this doctrine. Hoff v. Hoff, 48 Mich. 281. By the weight
of authority any misconduct on the part of the complainant which con-
stitutes ground for divorce, bars his suit, without reference to the offence
of which he complains. Watts v. Watts, i6o Mass. 464; Deisler v. Deis-
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ler, 59 N. Y. App. Div. 207. However, in other states a contrary rule
applies, and the two offences must be of the same character. Bast v.
Bast, 82 Ill. 584; Benerfening v. Benerfening, 23 Minn. 563. In England
and in some of the states, desertion will bar a suit based on an act of
adultery subsequently committed by the defendant. Yeatman v. Yeatman.
L. R. 2 P. 187; Walker v. Walker, 172 Mass. 82; Wilson v. Wilson, 40 Ia.
230; Conant v. Conant, xo Cal. 249.
EVIDENCE-HoMIcIDE-UNCOMMUNICAED THREATS.-STATE: r. BARKS-
DALE, 48 So. 264 (LA.) .- Held, that in a prosecution for manslaughter,
uncommunicated threats made by the deceased against the accused shortly
before the homicide are admissible in evidence as tending to show who
was the aggressor in the fatal encounter, and as supporting the plea of
self-defense. Nicholls, I., dissenting.
There is little doubt but that evidence of threats is admissible to show
animus. Greene v. State, 69 Ala. 6; Keener v. State, i8 Ga. I94; State v.
Evans, 33 W. Va. 417. Or to show who was the aggressor. State v.
Faile, 43 S. C. 52; Burns v. State, 49 Ala. 370; State v. Cushing, 14 Wash.
527. But these decisions must be taken with certain limitations, some
courts holding such evidence not admissible, unless some phase of the
other evidence tends to show a case of self-defense. Rutledge v. State,
88 Ala. 85; State v. Elliott, 45 Ia. 486; Bell v. State, 69 Ark. 148. And a
number of cases hold that threats made previous to the homicide are not
admissible in evidence when uncommunicated to the defendant. Rogers v.
State, 62 Ala. i7o; State v. Gregor, 21 La. Ann. 473; Vann v. State, 83
Ga. 44; State v. Maloy, 44 Ia. io4.
HUSBAND AND Wisr-NOTEs EXECuTED BEFORE MARRIAGE-VALIDITY.-
MAcKEowN V. LAcEY, 86 N. E. 799 (MASS.).-Held, that a note given by
a man for money loaned to him by a woman prior to their marriage was
not extinguished by their marriage, though husband and wife are incom-
petent to contract with each other.
At common law the debts of a woman are -extinguished by her mar-
riage with the debtor; Smiley v. Smiley's Admr., 18 Ohio St. 543; and a
note made and given by a husband to his wife before their marriage
becomes a nullity on the marriage. Abbot v. Winchester, io5 Mass. 115.
But under modern marriage reform acts, a debt previously due the
wife by the husband remains her separate property,* and she may enforce
payment by execution after marriage. Flenner v. Flenner, 29 ind. 564.
INNKEEPERS-INSULTS TO GUESTS-INNKEEP ~s' LIABILITY.-DE WOLF
V. FoRD, 86 N. E. 527 (N. Y.).-Held, that a hotel keeper is liable to
a female guest for a servant's unjustified acts, in the course of his
employment, in forcing his way into her room, subjecting her to mortifi-
cation of an exposure of her person, accusing her of immoral conduct,
and ordering her to leave the hotel.
At common law if a guest be beaten in an inn, the innkeeper is not
liable, 8 Coke, Sect. 33; and no other rule seems to have existed in this
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country, Rahmel v. Lehndorff, r42 Cal. 68i; Weeks v. McNulty, ioi Tenn.
495, holds that a hotel keeper is not an insurer of the person of his
guests, but he is only bound to exercise reasonable care in their behalf;
Evansville & T. H. R. Co. v. Griffin, ioo Ind. 221; and the duty cannot be
delegated so as to relieve the hotel keeper from liability for non-perform-
ance. Start v. Churchill, 36 N. Y. Supp. 476. This seems to be the gen-
eral rule. Goddard on Bailments & Carriers, Sect. 179; McHugh v.
Schlosser, 159 Pa. St. 48o. For unwarranted assaults by his servants he
is liable; Overstreet v. Moser, 88 Mo. App. 72; but only when done in the
discharge of the particular duties for which they are employed, Little
Miami R. Co. v. Wetmore, i9o Ohio St. ixo; Keith v. Lynch, ig Ill. App.
574. Contra: Schouler on Bailments, Sect. 323. The decision in this case is
in line with the tendency of modern legislation, which ig to enlarge the
responsibility of the master in favor of the servant. Pennsylvania Co. v.
Weddle, ioo Ind. 138.
LiCENsE-REvocATIoN-MILLER AND Lux v. KERN COUNTY LAND CO.,
99 PACIFIC, 179 (CAL.).-Where license was granted and the grantee
entered and expended a large sum of money in consequence thereof,
it was held, that the license was irrevocable. Beatty, C. J., dissenting.
It is generally held that a license is revocable at the will of the
grantor. Lambe v. Manning, 171 Ill. 612. Fleeker v. Rye & Banking
Co., 8I Ga. 461; Brown v. New York, 78 N. Y. App. 361. Some courts
modify this rule by holding that where expense is incurred by the
grantee the license is turned into an agreement that equity will enforce.
Dark v. Johnson, 55 Pa. St. 164. In many of these cases slight expense
has been considered sufficient to make the license irrevocable. Simons
v. Moorehouse, 88 Ind. 391. Other courts, however, have held that slight
expense is not enough. Wiseman v. Lucksinger, 84 N. Y. 31. Many courts
hold that the license may be revoked, even though the grantee has
expended time and money in reliance upon it. Turner v. Mobile., 135 Ala.
73; Lumber Co. v. Wilson, ii9 Mich. 4o6. Some courts allow the license
to be revoked upon compensation being made to grantee for expenditures
made by him. Snowden v. Willas, 19 Ind. io; Hall v. Chaffe, 13 Vt. 15o.
In all cases where the grantor is not allowed to revoke the license after
the grantee has incurred expense, the decisions are based upon the doc-
trine of estoppel. Clark v. Glidder, 6o Vt. -o2; Tufts v. Capen, 37 W. Va.
623.
MASTER AND SERvANT-CHOICE OF DANGEROUS METHOD -NEGLIGENCE.-
BRADY v. FLORENCE & C. C. R. Co., 98 PAC. 321 (CoLo.).-Held, that the
choice of the more dangerous of two methods of work by a servant does
not constitute negligence, if in doing so he does not disobey instructions
or rules, acts in good faith, and the method chosen might have been
adopted under like circumstances by a prudent man. Goddard and
Bailey, 3J., dissenting.
The facts in numerous cases have lead the courts to say that when
a man chooses a dangerous method of performing a duty, he is guilty of
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contributory negligence as a matter of law. Atchinson, T. & S. F. R. Co. v.
Tindal, 57 Kan. 719; Quirouct v. Alabama Great Southern R. Co., III
Ga. 315. The above is well illustrated in Lothrop v. Fitchburg R. Co.,
150 Mass. 423, where the court held as a matter of law that a brakeman,
who, in attempting to couple from the north side of the track two flat
cars of timbers, which on that side dangerously projected toward each
other, was killed by having his head caught between the timbers, did not
exercise due care, as the danger would have been avoided if he had
stooped or coupled from the south side of track. In other jurisdictions,
different facts have caused the courts to hold that the adoption of a
dangerous way of accomplishing a task when a safe way is open to him
is not necessarily negligence, but is a question of fact for the jury.
Gibson v. Burlington, C. R. & N. Ry. Co., 107 Ia. 596; Norton Bros. v.
Sczpurak, 70 Ill. App. 686; Flutter v. N. Y., Chicago & St. L. R. Co., 27
Ind. App. 511.
MASTER AND SERVANT-INJURY TO SERVANT-FELLOW SERVANTS-CON-
TRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.-DAVIDSON V. FLOUR CITY ORNAMENTAL IRON
WORKS, 119 N. W. 483 (MINN.).-The duties of an operator required him
to change the emery wheels from time to time to meet the exigencies of
the work, and in making these changes it was necessary to 'remove a
guard. This he .negligently failed to replace, and the revolving wheel
injured respondent. Held, that the operator and respondent were not
fellow servants, that the defenses of contributory negligence and assump-
tion of risk were not applicable, and that appellant was responsible for
failure to maintain the guard. Elliott, J., dissenting.
It has been held that all serving a common master and working
under the same control, deriving their authority and compensation from
the same source, and engaged in the same business, although in different
departments, are fellow servants and take the risk of each other's negli-
gence. N. & W. R. R. Co. v. Donnelly, 8o Va. 853. And that the
master's liability depends on his exercise of reasonable care to ascertain
the competency of his servant, whose negligence caused the injury to
the other servant. Nordyke & Marmon Co. v. Van Sant, 99 Ind. i88;
Norfolk & TV. R. Co. v. Nuckols, 91 Va. 193. But by the weight of
authority the true test to determine whether the negligent act causing
the injury is chargeable to the master, is, was the negligent employee in
the performance of the master's duty. or charged therewith? If so his
negligence is that of the master and the latter is liable, otherwise it is
theact of a co-servant. Colley on Torts, Stud.'s Ed. 553; Lewis v. Serfert,
116 Pa. 628. Another test is, did the injury result from the negligence
in performing personal duties, which the master cannot delegate. Koos-
orowska v. Glasser, 8 N. Y. Supp. 197; Enright v. Olliver & Burr, 69 N.
3. L. 357.
MASTER AND SERVANT-PERSONAL INJURIES--"RES IPSA LOQUITUR'--
KEENAN v McADAMS & CARTWRIGHT E. Co., 113 N. Y. Supp. 343.-Held,
that the rule of res ipsa loguitur cannot be applied, where no negligence
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on defendants part is shown by direct evidence, and it is apparent that
other causes may have led to the accident. Laughlin, J., dissenting.
The weight of authority holds that the origin of the accident being
fixed upon the defendant, negligence is presumed in the absence of
explanation. Shearman & R. on Negligence, Sect. 60; Spaulding v. C. & N.
W. R. Co., 30 Wis. 1io. In the following cases negligence was presumed:
explosion of a steamboat boiler; Posey v. Scoville, io Fed. Rep. 140;
running down cattle on the railroad track; Louisville R. Co. v. Conrey,
63 Miss. 562; and where a bolt fell from an elevated railway into the
street; Volkmar v. Manhattan Co., 134 N. Y. 418. But some courts hold
that negligence is not presumed in the absence of explanation. Huff v.
Austin, 46 Ohio St. 386; Consulich v. Standard Oil Co., 12 N. Y., 18; ex-
cept where the relation of carrier and passenger exists; Curtis v. Roches-
ter, etc., Ry. Co., i8 N. Y. 534; and where the condition or event permits
no inference save negligence on the part of the defendant. Mullen v. St.
John, 57 N. Y. 567.
RAILROADS-CROSSING ACCIDENTS-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-SCHAUB
V. KANSAS CrrY SOUTHERN, 113 S. W. 1163 (Mo. App.).-Held, that it is
the duty of one on approaching a railroad crossing, on a public street, to
look and listen and use reasonable care to discover appraching trains.
The absence of a watchman, usually stationed at a crossing, the fact
that the gates are open, or the silence of an alarm bell known to ring
on the approach of a train, do not free one from the duty to stop, look
and listen before entering the danger zone. St. Louis I. M. & S. Ry. Co.
v. Amos, 54 Ark. i59; Romeo v. Boston & M. R. R., 87 Me. 540; Tobias
v. Mich. Cent. R. Co., IIO Mich. 44o; Greenwood v. Philadelphia W. &
B. R. Co., I24 Pa. 572. However, he has a right to take any of these
facts into consideration in determining to what extent he will look.
Merrigan v. Boston & A. R. Co., 154 Mass. i89. Contrary to this view,
many jurisdictions have held the lack of the prescribed signs of warning
an assurance of a safe crossing; and that, one injured while crossing
without farther investigation regarding movements of trains is free from
contributory negligence. Chicago, R. L & P. Ry. Co. v. Clough, 134 Ill.
586; Kane v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 56 Hun. 648; Berry v.
Pennsylvania R. Co., 48 N. J. Law (i9 Vroom) i4I; Cleveland, C., C. &
L Ry. Co. v. Schneider, 45 Ohio St. 678. When one waits to allow a train
to pass, and only proceeds after the customary signal showing the way
to be clear, he need not stop to assure himself of the conditions. Conaty
v. New York, N. H. & H-. R. Co., 164 Mass. 572; Oldenburgh v. York
Cent. H. R. Co., 124 N. Y. 414.
RAILROADS-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-LAST CLEAR CHANCE.-WIL-
KINSON v. OREGON SoRx LINE R. R. Co., 99 PAC. 466 (UTAH).-Where
the plaintiff was driving along the side of a railroad track in a place of
safety, and, without looking, attempted to cross the track, and was
struck by an engine and injured, held, that he was not entitled to recover
on the ground that by the exercise of ordinary care defendant's servant
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could have seen him going into a dangerous place and prevented the
accident. Straup, C. J., dissenting.
The general rule is that if the injured person's own negligence con-
tributed to his injury, he cannot recover. Mqulton v. Ry. Co., 99 Me.
5o8; Jones v. R. R. Co., io7 Ala. 4oo; Trust Co. v. Fashion Co., io6 Ill.
App. 135. But the courts differ as to the degree of negligence necessary
to bar a recovery. Some courts hold slight negligence on the plaintiff's
part sufficient to bar his recovery. Lindberg v. Ry. Co., 83 Ill. App. 433;
Ry. Co. v. Bynum, 139 Ala. 389. Other courts hold that the plaintiff may
recover in spite of slight negligence on his part, when the defendant was
grossly negligent. R. R. Co. v. McElmurry, 24 Ga. 75. Many courts, by
basing their decisions on the doctrine of last clear chance, allow the
plaintiff to recover, even where his negligence contributed to the injury,
if the defendant, by use of ordinary care, could have prevented the
injury. McLamb v. Ry. Co., 122 N. C. 862; Kolb v. Transit Co., 76 S. W.
1O5O (Mo.); Atwood v. Ry. Co., 91 Me. 399. The Indiana courts adopt
the strict rule that if the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence he
cannot recover unless the defendant was wantonly and willfully negligent.
Ry. Co. v. Ceder, ino Ind. 376; De Lou v. Ry. Co., 22 Ind. App. 377. The
principle on which the doctrine allows the plaintiff to recover is that his
own negligence was the remote cause of the injury. Troy v' R. R. Co.,
99 N. C. 298; Tanner v. Ry. Co., 6o Ala. 621. And when the negligence
of the plaintiff and the defendant is concurrent, the plaintiff cannot re-
cover. Butler v. Ry. Co., 99 Me. i49; Power v. Gordon, io2 Va. 498.
SALES - WARRANTY - STATEMENTS CONSTITUTING. - WOOLDRIDGE V.
BROWN, 62 S. E. io76 (N. C.).-The buyer of coal told the salesman that he
was buying it to burn brick, and the salesman told him that it would burn
brick, and was used for that purpose. Held, that the salesman's state-
ment does not show a warranty of quality, or that the grade ordered
would burn brick.
No particular form of words is necessary to constitute a warranty.
Hawkins v. Pemberton, 51 N. Y. 198; and a representation by the seller as
to the quality of the article sold is a warranty if so intended by the
parties. Murray v. Smith, 4 Daly 277; Weimer v. Clement, 37 Pa. St. 147.
However, a mere statement by the seller of his own belief, upon a
matter concerning which the purchaser is to exercise his own judgment,
does not constitute a warranty. Coates v. Harvey, 1O N. Y. St.. 276.
But if the buyer relies upon the representation of the seller in making a
purchase, he affirmation will be given the effect of a warranty. Evans v.
Schriver Laundry Co., 57 Ill. App. ISo. A warranty of fitness of an
article for a specific purpose cannot be implied from a knowledge on the
part of the seller that the article was intended for such purpose. Bart-
lett v. Hoppock, 34 N. Y. 118; Rose v. Meeks, 91 Ia. 715.
